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Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we provide an integrative treatment of the welfare 
effects of trade and industrial policy under oligopoly, and characterize 
qualitatively the form that optimal intervention takes under a variety of 
assumptions about the number of firms, their conjectures about the response 
· of their rivals to their actions, the substitutability 9f tlieir products 
·and the markets in which they are sold. We find that when no domestic 
, consumption occurs optimal policy under duopoly with a single home firm 
depends on the difference between firms' actual responses to their rivals 
and the response that their Fivals' conjecture. If conjectures are con­
sistent, free trade is optimal. A tax or subsidy is indicated depending 
on the sign of the difference.between the conjectured and the actual reponse. 
With more than one home firm but still no domestic consumption, an export 
tax is indicated if conjectures are consistent. Production subsidies and 
export tax-cum-subsidies can raise national welfare in the presence of 
domestic consumption, because these policies can-mitigate the extent of 
the consumption distortion implicit in the deviation of price from marginal 
cost. 
Jonathan Eaton Gene M. Grossman
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New Haven, CT 06520 (609) 452-4823
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Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly* 
I. Introduction 
Implicit in many arguments for interventionist trade or industrial 
policy that have been advanced in the political realm appears to be an 
assumption that international markets are oligopolistic. It can be argued 
that international competition among firms in many industries is in fact 
imperfectly competitive, either because the number of firms is few, because 
p~oducts are differentiated, or because governments themselves have car­
telized the national firms engaged in competition. They may do so implic­
itly through tax policy, or explicitly through marketing arrangements. 
Government policies that affect the competitiveness of their firms in 
international markets, as well as the welfare of their consumers, involve 
not only traditional trade policy (trade taxes and subsidies) but policies 
that affect other aspects of firms' costs, such as output tax and sub­
sidies. We refer to intervention of this sort as industrial policy. 
Until recently the theory of commercial policy has considered the 
implications of intervention under conditions of perfect competition or, 
more rarely, pure monopoly. As a consequence, this literature cannot respond 
to many of the arguments that have been advanced in favor of activist govern­
ment policies. The only argument for departing from laissez faire is the 
traditional optimal tariff argument. If (i) individual firms and consumers 
behave atomistically, (ii) the amount of trade that the economy engages in 
is sufficient to affect world prices, and (iii) the country's government 
can act as a Stackelberg leader in setting a trade tax before firms set 
prices or quantities, then a departure from free trade is optimal from the 
national perspective. From a world welfar·e perspective, however, free 
trade remains optimal. Our purpose in this paper is to extend the theory 




of nationally optimal policy to situations in which individual firms 
exercise market power in world markets. 
The primary implications of oligopoly for the design of trade policy 
are (i) that economic profits are not driven to zero, and (ii) that a price 
equal to marginal cost does not generally obtain. The first of these 
means that government policies that shift the industry equilibrium to the 
advantage of domestic firms may be sociaily beneficial from a national 
perspective. The second feature of oligopolistic competition suggests 
that trade policy may be a substitute for antitrust policy in an open­
economy setting, if policies can be devised that effectively shrink the 
wedge between opportunity cost in production and marginal valuation to 
consumers. 
A number of recent papers have focused.· on the profit-shifting motive 
for trade policy under oligopoly. Brander and Spencer (1982a) develop a 
. model in which one home firm and one foreign firm produce perfectly ·sub­
stitutable goods, and compete in a third-country market. They consider a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and find that if the home country's government 
can credibly pre-commit itself to pursue a particular trade policy before 
firms make production decisions (and if demand is not very convex), then 
1an export subsidy is optimal. Dixit (1984) has extended the Brander-
Spencer result to cases with more than two firms, and establishes that an 
export subsidy in a Cournot oligopoly equilibrium is optimal as long as 
the number of domestic firms is not too large. Finally, Krugman (1983) 
shows that under increasing returns to scale, protection of a local firm 
in one market (e.g., by an import tariff).can shift the equilibrium to 




These papers all provide examples in which interventionist trade 
policy can raise national welfare in imperfectly competitive environments. 
Yet each makes special assumptions about the form of oligopolistic com­
petition, the substitutability of the goods produced and the markets in 
which they are sold. It is difficult to extract general principles for 
trade policy from this. analysis. -Our purpose here is to provide an 
integrative treatment of the welfare effects of trade and industrial policy 
under oligopoly, and to characterize the form that optimal intervention 
takes under a variety of assumptions about the number of firms, their 
assumptions about rivals' responses to their actions (their conjectural 
variations), the substitutability of their products and the countries where 
they are sold • 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we consider 
a general conjectural v.ariations model of a duopoly in which one home firm 
competes with one foreign firm either in the foreign firm's local market 
or in a third-country market. We find that the sign of the optimal trade 
or industrial policy (i.e. wheth_er a tax or subsidy is optimal) depends 
on the relationship between the home firm's conjectural variations and the 
actual equilibrium reactions of the foreign firm. We note the form that 
optimal policy takes in Cournot and Bertrand equilibria and in what Bresnahan 
and Perry have called "consistent" conjectures equilibrium. When conjectures 
are consistent a policy of free trade is optimal. 
In Section III we extend the analysis by expanding the number of firms 
while maintaining the &ssumption of no domestic consumption. Here we show 
that free trade is optimal under consisten~ conjectures if there is only 
one home firm, regardless of the number of foreign competitors. If two or 
more domestic firms compete in the foreign market, the optimal intervention 
in a symmetric consistent conjectures equilibrium is always to tax production 
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or exports. 
Finally, in Section IV, we return to the duopoly case, and introduce 
domestic consumption. In the special case of perfectly substitutable 
products and consistent conjectural variations on the part of the home 
country· firm, the introduction of a small production subsidy by the home 
country government raises national welfare. It does so by reducing the 
price for the commodity faced by domestic consumers, thereby reducing the 
difference between the marginal utility of consumption of the product and ' 
:·the cost of production, which is necessarily positive under oligopolistic 
·' competition. If, instead, trade intervention is considered, then either 
mi export tax or a subsidy may be indicated. 
'"l'heuin findings of the paper are summarized in a concluding section. 
II. Optimal Trade Policy and the Role of Conjectural Variations: The 
Case of Duopoly 
In this and subsequent sections we characterize optimal government 
policy in the presence of oligopolistic competition among domestic and 
foreign firms in international markets. Each firm produces a single pro­
duct which may be a perfect or imperfect substitute for the output of its 
rivals. We specify competition:~mong firms as Nash in output quantities 
• . 2 
with arbitrary conjectural variations. The domestic government can tax 
(or subsidize) the output of domestic firms~ tax (or subsidize) the exports 
of these firms, and tax (or subsidize) the imports from the foreign rivals 
of domestic firms. Its objective is to maximize national welfare. 
The government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis both domestic 
and foreign firms in setting ad valorem tax (subsidy) rate~ . 3 Thus firms 
set outputs taking tax and subsidy rates as given. In other words, the 
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government can pre-commit itself to a specific policy intervention that 
will not be altered even if it is sub-optimal.£.! post, once firms' outputs 
are determined. For simplicitly we assume the absence of government policy' 
in other countries, although this assumption has no qualitative implications 
for our results. 
In this section we consider optimal government policy when oligopolistic 
competition takes its simplest possible form: a single domestic firm co~ 
petes with a single foreign firm in a foreign market. In the absence of 
domestic consumption government trade policy (export taxes and subsidies) 
is equivalent to government industrial policy (output taxes and subsidies). 
We assume that the government's objective function places equal 
weight on the home-firm's profit and government tax revenue. Its objective 
is therefore one of maximizing national product. 
Denote the output (and exports) of the home firm by x and let c(x) 
be its total production cost, c'(x) > O. Upper case letters denote 
corresponding magnitudes for the foreign firm, with C' (X) > O. Pretax 
revenue of the home and foreign firms are given by the functions r(x, X) 
and R(x, X) respectively. These satisfy the conditions that 
;)r(x, X) < O 
- ax 
aR(x, X) < O 
- ax 
These conditions state that an increase in the output of the competing pro­
duct lowers the total revenue of each firm. They are implied by the assump­





profits of the home and foreign firms are given by: 
TT s (1 - t) r(x, X) - c(x) 
and 
Il = R(x, X) - C(X) 
respectively. Here t denotes the ad valorem output (or export) tax. The 
domestic firm's conjecture about the foreign firm's outpuf response to 
changes in its own output is given by the parameter Y. The foreign firm's 
· corresponding conjectural variation is r. 
The Nash equilibrium quantities, given the level of home country 
1>01icy intervention, are determined by the first-order conditions 
(1) 
Ri(x, X) + f~(x, X) - C'(X) = 0 (2) 
We assume that the second-order conditions for profit maximization are 
satisfied. 
We now demonstrate: 
Theorem 1: A positive (negative) output or ~xport tax can yield higher 
national welfare than laissez-faire (t = 0) if the home firm conjectures a 
foreign change in output in response to an increase in its own output that 
is smaller (larger) than the actual response. 
Proof: National welfare generated by the home firm is given by w where 
w = (1 - t)r(x, X) - c(x) + tr(x, X) 
• r(x, X) - c(x) (3) 
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The change in welfare resulting from a small change in the tax (or subsidy) 
4rate tis 
(4) 
Substituting the first-order condition, (1), into (4), we obtain5 
dw _ {- yr _ tc' ] (dx) + r (dXdt)dt - 2 1 - t dt 2 (5) 
Expression (2) implicitly defines the output of the foreign firm, X, as 
a function of domestic output x. Denote this function i/J(x). The tax rate 
t does not appear directly as an argument of this function, since t does not 
appear in expression (2). Therefore dX/dt = iµ' (x) (dx/dt). Define. 
g = (dX/dt)/(dx/dt) = ~'(x); the term g measures the slope of the foreign 
firm's actual reaction to x. A first-order condition for maximizing national 
welfare obtains when dw/dt = O, or, incorporating the definition of g into 
equation (5) 
-r2 (g - y) = tc'/(1 - t) {6) 
Since r2 < 0, the left-hand and right-hand s:i,des of expressi.)n (6) are of the· 
same sign if 1 > t > 0 and g > y, or t < 0 and g < y. The term 
g - y is the difference between the actual response of X to a change in 
x (i.e., 1jl' (x)) and the home firm's conjectural varation. When g >y a tax 
can yield more income than laissez-faire, conversely when g < y. 
Q.E.D. 
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We now turn to some specific conjectural variations that are commonly 
assumed in models of oligopolistic competition. 
A. Cournot Conjectures 
Under Cournot behavior, each firm conjectures that when it chan~es 
its output the other firm will hold its output fixed. Thus, y= r = ') 
in this case, and (6) becomes 
- gr a::tc'/(1- t) (7)2 
Totally differentiating the equilibrium conditions (1) and (2) to solve for 
g this expression may be written: 
tc' 
(u)
1 - t 
The second-order condition for the foreign firm's profit maximization 
e~sures that the left-hand side of this expression has the sign of R •21 
Letting t* denote the optimal export tax (or subsidy, if negative), we hav~ 
established 
Proposition 1: In a Cournot duopoly with no home consumption, sgn t* = sgn r.,., .. 
.:.l 
In th.e case of Cournot duopoly R .is the slope of the foreign firm's21 
reaction curve. If R < 0, then an increase in home output causes the21 
foreign firm to reduce its output. Linear demand necessarily implies 
~l < 0, and many, but not all, specifications of demand imply this sign as 
well. 
Proposition 1 constitutes a slight generalization of the Brander­
Spencer (1982a) argument for an export subsidy to situations in which the 
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competing firms produce imperfect substitutes: an export subsidy raises 
domestic welfare in a Cournot eqttilibrium by transfering industry profit 
to the domestic firm. Graphically, the tax shifts the domestic reaction 
curve so that it intersects the foreign curve at the point that the home 
firm would have chosen had the home firm been a Stackelberg leader. 
In the case of Cournot conjectures the home firm's conjecture that the 
foreign firm will not lower its output in response to its own quantity 
increase is an overly pessimistic one. When R
21 < 0, the foreign firm's 
actual reaction to such a deviation is to reduce output. The home govern­
ment, with its ability to pre-commit itself to a tax on output before firms 
determine their output levels, can take advantage of the difference between 
the firm's conjecture and the true response. 
B. Bertrand Conjectures 
In a Bertrand equilibrium, each firm conjectures that its rival will 
hold its price fixed in response to any changes in it own price. Define 
the direct demand functions for the output of the home and foreign firms as 
d(p, P) and D(p, P) respectively. The total profits of the two firms are 
therefore 
n(~, P) = (1 -t)pd(p, P) - c(d(p, P)) 
Il(p, P) ~ PD(p, P) - C(D(p, P)) . 
Each firm sets its price to maximize its profit taking the other fit,n's 




While the home firm conjectures that the foreign firm will not change 
its price in response to a change in p, .the true response is given,. from 
differentiating (9b), by 
(10) 
The second-order condition for the foreign firm's profit maximization 
implies that the sign of expresssion (10) is the same as that of ITZl. If 
the two products are substitutes (i.e. dz > 0 and n1 > 0) .and returns to 
scale are non-increasing (c" _:: 0, C" > 0) a positive response will emerge 
unless an increase in its rival's price has a significantly negative effect 
on the slope of the demand curve facing the home firm. In the special 
cases of either perfect substitutes or linear demands a positive response 
necessarily obtains. There is consequently a presumption in the 
case of competition between producers of goods that are substitutes that 
the Bertrand conjecture on the part of a firm that is cutting its price 
to expand its sales is overly optimistic. 
The actual and conjectured price responses can be translated into 









The Bertrand conjecture on the part of the home firm implies a conjectured 
quantity response given by 
(dX I dx) I . D /dy c dp dp • 1 l (11)
dP = 0 . 
The actual response is 
(12) 
The term g - y is positive as long as rr
21 > 0 (the foreign firm responds 
to a price cut by cutting its price). Applying theorem 1 we conclude: 
Proposition 2: In a Bertrand duopoly with no home consumption sgn t* = 
Presumption regarding the sign of the optilil;al trade intervention 
when duopolistic behavior is Bertrand is exactly the opposite of that in 
the Cournot case; that is, an export,!!! is generally required. The intui­
tion for this result is instructive. When a firm holds a Bertrand conjecture 
its belief about its rival's reaction to its own output expansion is 
typically overly optimistic. It conjectures that the competitor will 
respond to its own price cut (output' expansion) by maintaining a constant 
price, whereas for most demand and cost structures (including the cases 
of perfect substitutes and of linear demands) the equilibrium response of 
the competitior is to ·1ower its price. (Note the contrast with the Cournot 
case.) Thus, the government can shift industry profit to the home firm 
by forcing it to be less aggressive so as to take into account the true 
slope of the foreign response curve, that is by taxing sales. 
- 12 -
C. Consistent Conjectures 
The final special case we consider is one in which duopolistic 
behavior is characterized by consistent conjectures. A consistent con­ I
jectures equilibrium (CCE), as defined and analyzed by Bresnahan (1981) 
and Perry (1982), among others,is one in which each firm's conjectural 
variations are equal to the actual equilibrium responses of its rivals 
that would result if that firm actually were to change its output by a 
small amount. Bresnahan (1981, p. 942) argues that consistency of con­
jectures is a reasonable restriction to place on oligopolistic behavior 
if exogenous changes in the market environment are frequent enough to 
allow firms to learn their rival's true responses. In our case, for 
example, changes in trade policy or in factor prices in one country would 
shift a single firm's reaction curve, and the locus of new equilibria 
would provide the firm with information about the slope of its rival's 
reaction curve. 
The slope of the foreign reaction curve in our model is given -by 
(dX/dt)/(dx/dt) = g. Thus, a consistent conjectures equilibrium is 
defined by y = g. The following proposition follows immediately from 
expression (6): 6 
Proposition 3: In a duopoly with consistent conjectures and no home 
consumption, t* = O. 
The optimality of free trade under consistent co~jectures emerges 
because there exists no shift of the home firm's reaction curve that can 
transfer industry profit to that firm, given the response of its rival. 
* * * 
The duopoly example with no home consumption highlights the profit­
shifting motive for trade policy intervention in an imperfectly competitive 
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market. We have endowed the home government with a strategically advan­
tageous position in relation to firms by assigning it the role of a 
Stackelberg leader in setting policy. In such circumstances the home 
government can raise national product by shifting the duopoly equilibrium 
to exploit any deviation of the home firm's conjectures from the actual 
equilibrium response of the foreign firm. If the home firm is overly ' 
pessimistic in its conjecture about the reaction to an increase in its 
own output an export subsidy raises income, while if its conjecture is 
too optimistic an export tax raises income. When conjectures are act;.ually 
"correct," as they are in a consistent conjectures equilibrium, then no 
scope remains for shifting profit to the home firm by shifting its reac­
tion function, and free trade is optimal from the national perspective. 
Ill. Optimal Trade Policy: The Case of Multi-Firm Oligooolv and 
Consistent Conjectures 
ln this section we extend our analysis by introducing more than two 
firms. For analytical convenience we confine our attention to symmetric 
configurations. We continue to assume throughout this section that there 
is no home country consumption of the outputs of the oligopolistic industry. 
Suppose there are n home firms and m foreign firms in the industry. 
The profit of home firm i is 
~
i 
c (1 - t 
i )ri (x,1 .•• , n •.n+l n+m i iX , A , • • • , X ) - C (x ) • 
while a foreign firm earns 
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iwhere t denotes the output tax imposed on firm i. The conjecture of 
firm i about the response of the jth firm's output to a change in its 
own output is denoted Yij, j; i, j = 1, ••• , n+m. 
The home country national product derived from this industry is 
w = 
n
I r i - Ci 
i=l 
First-order conditions for profit maximization are: 
i i i' i ii"
(1 - t )ri - C + (1 - t) 
n+m
L r.y J = O; (i = 1, •.. , n) (13a)Jj=l 
:j#i 
(j = n+l, ••• , n+m) (13b) 
Imposing the symmetry assumption and totally differentiating (13a) 
and (13b) at ti= 0 (i = 1, ••• , n),we obtain 
where A(r) is an rxr matrix with diagonal elements a and off-diagonal 
elements 8, dx is an n-dimensional c_olunm vector with elements dxi, dX 
is an m-dimensional column vector with elements dXj, dt(n) is an n-dimen­
sional column vector with elements dti and O(m) is an m-dimensional column 




and y=_y • In considering an export tax we setti
- J 
= t, i = 1, ••• , n. 
Differentiating home country national product with respect to the vector 
tat t e O yields: 
dw
dt (n+m-l)y)(dx
2/dt) + r 1 
2
nm(dXn+l/dt) 
1 2 1 · dXn+l/dt-= nr
2 




In this section we focus on the case in which firms form conjectures 
consistently. As we showed in section II, when there is a single domestic 
firm and a single foreign firm and conjectures are consistent, national 
welfare is maximized under laissez-faire. More generally, the direction 
of departure from laissez-faire depends upon the sign of the difference 
between the actu~l and the conjectured response of the foreign firm. By 
considering the case of consistent conjectures we can isolate the effect 
of increasing the number of firms on optimal policy. 
Using (15), we are able to demonstrate: 
·Proposition 4: In a symmetric, oligopolistic, consistent conjectures 
equilibrium with n home firms, m foreign firms, and no home consumption, 
the optimal production (export) tax is zero if n=l and positive if n>l. 
The proof of this proposition is provided in the appendix. It can 
be understood intuitively by noting that when conjectures are consistent, 
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the profit-shifting motive for government intervention disappears. What 
remains is the standard optimal-tariff prescription. Whenever there is 
more than a single home country firm, each home firm ignores the pecuniary' 
externality it imposes on other domestic firms when it raises its output. 
Priva~e incentives lead to socially excessive outputs, since home income 
includes all home firm profits. The government can enforce the cooperative 
equilibrium in which home firms act as a group to maximize the home 
country's total profit by taxing exports or sales. This externali_ty does 
not arise when there is only one home firm; consequently, free trade is 
optimal in that case. 
If home firms conjecture that their rivals react less agressively 
than they actually do, as is often the case in Bertrand equilibrium, 
then the desirability of an output or export tax is enhanced. Conversely, 
when domestic firms conjecture responses that are more aggressive than 
the actual ones, then either a tax or a subsidy may raise national.product, 
depending upon whether the national-market-power effect or the profit­
shifting effect.of the policy dominates. 
IV. Trade and Industrial Policy in the Presence of Domestic Consumption 
Thus far we have ruled out domestic consumption of the outputs of 
the.oligopolistic industry under consideration. This has allowed us to 
focus on the profit-shifting motive for trade policy. However, by making 
this assumption, we have neglected a second way in which interventionist 
trade or industrial policy might yield welfare gain~ when markets are 
imperfectly competitive. Since oligopolistic markets are generally 
characterized by a difference between the price and marginal cost of a 
product, there is a potential second-best role for trade and industrial 
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policy (in the absence of first-best antitrust policy) to reduce this 
distortion. 
When domestic consumption is positive, production taxes or subsidies 
and export taxes or subsidies are no longer identical. In this section 
we will consider the welfare effects of both types of policies in the 
duopoly model of Section II, recognizing that when there is more than 
qne domestic firm, the national-market-power motive for taxation of 
output or exports is always present. In addition, in order to focus on 
the considerations fqr trade and industrial policy introduced by the pre­
sence of domestic consumption, we.shall examine only the consistent­
conjectures duopoly. Recall that in this case free trade is optimal when 
there is no domestic consumption. 
To make our point as simply as possible, we assum:e that the duopolistic 
competitors produce a single, homogeneous good. We also assume perfect 
arbitrage with zero transport costs, so that under a production tax or 
subsidy consumers at home and abroad face the same price for the product. 
In other words, firms cannot price discriminate by setting different prices 
in different countries. 
A. Production Tax or Subsidy . 
.. 
Let p(r+-X) be the inverse world demand function and let home country 
direct demand be h(p). The corresponding foreign demand is H(p). If 
a production tax at rate tis imposed the profit of the domestic firm is 
8~ c (1 - t)p(x + X)x - c(x). Consumer surplus at home is r h(q) dq. 
Domestic tax revenue is tpx. Summing these gives total home 
p 
country.. 
welfare from producing, consuming and taxing the product: 
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w. px - C + rh(q) dq 
The change in home welfare resulting from a small change in the 
outpu; tax is 
dw ( + , , )dx + ,dX . dPdt = p xp - c dt xp dt. - ~ 
Substituting the first-order condition for the home-firm's profit maximization, 
this becomes: 
:: = {xp'(g - y) + t[p + xp'(l + Y)]} :: - h~ (16) 
_F;~aluating (16) at t = 0, and imposing the condition that conjectures are 
consistent (g = y), we find dw/dt = -hdp/dt. The choice between a pro­
duction tax and a production subsidy hinges on which policy would lower 
the price faced by domestic consumers, thereby reducing the consumption 
distortion associated with imperfect competition. 
It is easy to calculate dp/dt = p'(dx + dX)/dt. Applying Cramer's 





[ (C' - p) X - C"]dt !:::. (17) 
where~ is the determinant of the 2x2 Jacobian matrix, which is assumed 
to be positive for stability. If foreign marginal cost is increasing (C" > 0), 
then p > C', and the right hand side of (17) is unambiguously negative. 
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A production subsidy raises world output, and hence lowers world price. 
Alternatively, if marginal costs at home and abroad are constant ( c" = 0) 
and C"-= 0), then the consistent conjectures equilibrium is the Bertrand 
equilibrium (see Bresnahan, 1981), so that p = C' and d(x + X)/dt = 0. 
In this case the optimal industrial policy is laissez faire. 
Proposition 5: In a homogenous product·duopoly with consistent con-
jecutres and non-zero domestic consumption, 
(i) if c" = 0 and C" = O, then t* = 0 
"(ii) if C" > 0, then t* < 0 
B. Export Tax or Subsidy 
Finally, we consider the welfare effects of a small export tax 
at rate T. Under this policy domestic consumers pay a price p(l-1) 
for the good, and home goyemment revenue is pT(x - h). The world 
inverse demand function is now written as p(x + X, 1), where 
pl-= 1/{H'(p) + (1 - T)h'[p(l - T)]} and 
Proceeding as before, we find 
dw I .. hp d (x + X) + P2_(x - h)dT 1 dTT=O 
In this case, however, it is no longer possible to sign unambiguously 
the effect of a small tax or subsidy on total world output. In addi­
tion, there is a second term that now enters the expression for dw/dT, 
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which at T = 0 is unambiguously positive or negative depending upon 
whether the home country is a net exporter or importer of the product. 
Given total output, an export tax raises the world price of the export 
good since it subsidizes domestic consumption. This standard terms-of­
trade.effect favors an export tax or import tariff, just as it does when 
the market is competitive. 
~o recapitulate the argument of thjs section, either an export tax 
or an export subsidy may raise domestic welfare in a duopolistic market 
with domestic consumption. · When conjectures are cons.istent, any profit­
shifting motive for policy intervention is eliminated. What remains is a 
standard terms-of-trade effect, and what might be termed a "consumption­
distortion effect," arising from the gap between price and marginal cost. 
The former always indicates an export tax or import tariff, while the J.atter 
may favor either a tax or a subsidy, depending on the precise forms of 
the demand and cost functions. 
V. Conclusions 
We have analyzed the weifare effects of trade policy and industrial 
policy (production taxes and subsidies) for a range of specifications of an 
oligopolistic industry. A number of general propositions for optimal 
policy emerge. First, either trade _policy or industrial policy may raise 
domestic welfare if oligopolistic profits can be shifted to home country 
firms. Policies that achieve this profit shifting can work only if the 
government is able to set its policy ir. advance of firms' production 
decisions, and if government policy commitments are credible. Further­
more, in· the duopoly case profits can be shifted only if firms' conjecutral 
variations differ from the true equilibrium responses that would result if 
- 21 -
they were to alter their output levels. The choice between a tax and a 
subsidy in this case depends on whether firms' conjectures about their 
rival's response are overly optimistic or overly pessimistic. 
Second, whenever there is more than one domestic firm, competition 
among them is detrimental to home country social welfare. In 
other words, there exists a pecuniary externality since each domestic 
firm does not take into account the effect of its own actions on the profits 
of other domestic competitors. A production or export tax will lead 
domestic firms to restrict their outputs, shifting them closer to the 
level that would result with collusion. In this familiar way a production 
or export tax enables the home country to exploit its monopoly power in 
trade fully. 
Finally, when there is domestic consumption of the output of the 
oligopolistic industry, there are two further motives for policy inter­
vention. First, consumers' marginal valuation of the product will generally 
differ from domestic marginal cost of production due to the collective 
exertion of monopoly power by firms in the industry. A welfare improving 
policy for this reason should increase domestic consumption. When industrial 
policy is used, a production subsidy will achieve this result, whereas the 
appropriate trade policy instrument may be either an export (or import) 
tax or an export (or import) subsidy. Second, there is the usual 
externality caused by the multiplicity of small domestic consumers, who 
do not take into account the effect of their demands on world prices. 
Industrial policy cannot be used to overcome this externality, but if the 
country is a net exporter (importer) an export (import) tax will have a 
favorable impact on the country's terms of trade. The formulation of 




In this appendix we prove Proposition 4. To do so, we first prove 
the following lemma: 
Lemma: Let A(r) be an rxr matrix with diagonal elements a and other 
elements B•. Let B(r) be the matrix formed by deleting the first row and 
second. column of A(r+l).. . Then . 
r-1B(a - S) 
Proof: The proof is by induction. The formulae hold trivially for 





Expanding IA(r)I along its first row, we have 
(A3) 
Similarly expanding IB(r)I along its first row yields 
(A4) 
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Substituting (Al) and (A2) into (A3), we have 
~2 2• (a - S) [a + 8(r - 2)cx8 - (r - 1)8 ] 
r-1= (ex - B) [ex+ (r-1)8] 
A similar substitution into (A4) yields 
r-2= 6(a - 6) [a+ (r - 2)6 - (r - 1)8] 
r-1.. S(cx - 6) · 
Q.E.D. 
We are now able to prove Proposition 4, which we restate here 
for convenience. 
Proposition 4: In a symmetric, oligopolistic, consistent conjectures 
equilibrium with n home firms, m foreign firms, and no home consumptio~, 
the optimal production (export) tax is zero if n=l and positive if n > 1. 
Proof 
In the case of consistent conjectures firm i anticipates a response 
on the part of firm j to an exogenous change in its own output that 
corresponds to its actual general equilibrium response. To generate 
an exogenous change in xi consider the effect of variation in the tax 
t 1 on the output of firm i. Such a variation affects only firm i's 
first-order condition for profit maximization, given output of all 
other firms. The total response in the output of any other firm to the 
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variation in ti derives solely from the variation it induces in. x1. 
Therefore,the consistent conjecture of firm i about firm j's response 
to a change in its own output is given 
1 1 1
{ (d,_1 /dt ) / (dx /dt ) for j = 1, ••• ' n j I i
y = 





••• t n; j,'i 
and k = n+l, 
















Applying the lemma proved above to ~xpression (A5) yields: 
dw
dt (A6) 
Stability of the market equilibrium requires that the principle 
minors of A(n+m) alternate in sign, the first one negative. 9 Therefore, 
a< 0, and -i-' /32 > 0, which implies jal > IBI, and hence ~ - S < 0. 
Th f S) (n+m-2) . . . "f +· . d . .ere ore (a - is positive i nm is even an is negative 
othe~ise. Similarly, A(n+m-l) is the n+m-1 principle minor of A(n+m), 
which is positive if n+m is odd and negative otherwise. Since r~ < 0 
and, from the first-order condition (13a), A=~
1' 
/(1 - t) >·O, 






1. In Spencer and Brander (1982), the authors study a two-stage game 
in which a capacity or R&D investment is made at a stage prior to 
production. In such a setting, export subsidies and R&D subsidies 
are each welfare improving if implemented separately, but an optimal 
policy package involves an export subsidy and an R&D tax. Brander 
and Spencer (1982b) extend the basic argument for intervention to 
situations in which duopolistic competition takes place in the home 
market. In such cases an import tariff is often beneficial. 
2. Restricting attention to output rivalry entails no loss of generality, 
however. Kamien and Schwartz (1983) demonstrate that any conjectural 
variations equilibrium (CVE) in quantities has a corresponding CVE 
in prices. 
3. Analysis of government policy in international markets is typically 
based on this assumption. See, e.g., ;,Spencer and Brander (1982). 
It may be justified by specifying the political process of establish­
ing policy as time-consuming and costly, or by endowing the govern­
ment with a reputation for adhering to announced policy. 
4. The second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied locally as long 
as (i) the home firm's first and second order conditions for profit 
maximization are satisfied and (ii) the foreign firm's actual 
response to a change in x does not differ significantly from the 
response conjectured by the home firm. 
5. We henceforth drop the arguments of the revenue and cost functions 
and their partial derivatives whene~er no confusion is created by 
doing so. The revenue functions and their partial derivatives 
are understood to be evaluated at the equilibrium value of 
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(x, X), while the cost functions and their derivatives are evaluated 
at x or X, whichever is appropriate. 
6. The second-order condition for a social optimum is satisifed at 
the free-trade equilibrium if the product-market equilibrium is 
stable. 
·1. In a symmetric, free-trade equilibrium all firms produce the same 
output, and all revenue and cost function are symmetric, so that, 
i 1for example, r = r, i = 1, ••• , n. For notational simplicity 
and with no loss of generality the following analysis is expressed 
in terms of the output, revenue, and cost functions of the first 
home firm and n+l'st foreign firm. 
8. We assume that this integral is bounded. 
9. For a discussion of the stability conditions for conjectural variations 
models of oligopoly, see Seade (19~0). 
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